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The Bank Financing of 
Small Unlisted Firms in the UK: 
An Analysis of Recent Conflicts
Kevin Keasey 
Robert Watson
This paper examines the characteristics of UK small firm bank finance and 
the causes of the frequently strained relationship between small firms and 
banks in the UK. Debt, credit rationing, and call option problems under the 
UK system are examined. The bank’s solutions including the potentially 
harmfiil “secured overdraft system” are then considered. It is argued that the 
majority of solutions tried by the banking system led to a heightened conflict 
of interest between small firms and banks during the recent recession due to 
the banks’ loan restructuring to avoid unneccessary risk.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the bank financing of UK small businesses and the 
institutional factors responsible for the frequently strained relationships 
between the two parties. An apparently perennial strain upon UK small 
firm/bank relationships has been the perception that ‘credit rationing’ 
exists (the so-called ‘finance gap’), particularly in relation to long term 
finance, and that there has been a lack of transparency regarding the 
pricing and assessment by the banks of their small business lending risks. 
Of course, it is probably inevitable that some element of ‘credit rationing’ 
will arise simply as a consequence of conflicts of interest and costly to 
remedy asymmetric information (the problem of agency costs). 
Nevertheless, it is argued that additional tensions between UK small 
firms and banks in the early 1990s were generated by three factors; 
namely, the recent macroeconomic instability and regulatory changes 
outside of either party’s control, the particular type of debt financing
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(the ‘overdraft’ system) used and the oligopolistic banking market and 
associated bureaucratic organizational structures of UK banks.
Throughout their history the four main UK clearing banks have been 
primarily retail deposit takers specialising in holding government debt 
and the provision of short term advances. Consequently, unlike the 
“investment banking” systems of many other European countries, the UK 
clearing banks were never involved in any major way with supplying 
long-term debt or equity finance to UK industry (see Collins, 1991). In 
addition, the small firm sector has historically been a relatively minor 
component of both the UK economy and the banks’ lending portfolios. 
Until the 1980s, domestic competition between banks for small business 
custom was very limited and lending decisions were typically at the 
discretion of the local branch manager. As predominantly retail deposit 
takers, the branch level of UK clearing banks does not normally contain 
specialist personnel competent in small business risk assessment. Branch 
managers, rather than committing valuable resources to detailed 
assessments of individual small business risks, have generally been 
content to make available short-term advances secured on the business 
and personal assets of owner-managers.
\^ i l e  the domestic UK banking system has been opened up to much 
greater competition since the mid 1980s, the majority of advances made 
by the main clearing banks to small business continues to be 
predominantly in the form of secured overdrafts (line-of-credit) and, to a 
lesser extent, other forms of short-term loans (see Keasey & Watson, 
1995) for a review of the empirical evidence). Though legally repayable 
on demand, in practice the overdraft is a significant source of long-term 
finance since the banks do not normally reduce previously agreed limits 
for accounts in good order. Thus, the overdraft is a more-or-less 
permanent, though variable, item on many small firm balance sheets.
The severe economic downturn in the UK in 1990, however, 
produced complaints from small businesses that the banks had begun to 
unilaterally withdraw or significantly reduce previously agreed overdraft 
facilities at short notice and without just cause. Since in the majority of 
cases, the firm is unable to raise the cash resources to immediately repay 
the overdraft, it is forced into liquidation. As the overdraft is normally 
secured via a floating charge on the firm’s assets, upon liquidation the 
banks are able, via their secured creditor status, to obtain full repayment 
ahead of all other (non-statutory) third party claims. While from the 
banks’ viewpoint, this simply involves the exercise of their put option in 
order to recover their investment when they perceive that default 
probability has increased significantly, small business representatives.
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politicians and media commentators have generally interpreted the 
banks’ actions as destructive and as forcing viable businesses into 
unnecessary liquidation.
Although several official inquires have found no evidence of bank 
misbehaviour (e.g., see the “Bank Cleaned...,” 1991; “Office of Fair 
Trading...,” 1991; and “Research Retakes...,” 1992), it is argued below 
that the UK banks reluctance to expend resources in the monitoring and 
assessment of firm-specific risk and to simply rely upon the put option 
characteristics of the secured overdraft, contributed to the conflict. 
However, other contributory factors can also be identified. These 
include the large increase in the number of (often economically 
marginal) enterprises created during the 1980s, the greatly increased 
domestic and international competition confronting the UK banks over 
the same period and the economic downturn in 1990 which falsified the 
assumptions upon which previous lending decisions had been based. As 
the proportion of small firms experiencing financial difficulties increased 
dramatically after 1990, the ability of the banks to respond in a manner 
which accurately reflected changes in their exposure to individual, firm 
specific, risks was limited due to organizational and cultural constraints 
internal to themselves.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section 
briefly describes recent changes in the UK small firm sector and the 
organizational characteristics of the owner-managed firm which 
exacerbated the inherent agency conflicts associated with debt financing. 
Section III discusses, with particular reference to small firms, the call 
option characteristics of equity which exposes the debt supplier to 
uncompensated, ex post, business risk. This section also reviews the 
theoretical asymmetric information credit rationing literature and the 
UK banks’ traditional solution to these agency problems. In Section IV 
we discuss how the structure of banking in the UK, along with the 
marked macroeconomic instability of recent years, has impacted upon 
the small firm/bank relationship. The final section considers the 
implications of the discussions for the relationships between small firms 
and banks in the UK.
II. THE UK SMALL FIRM SECTOR
Although the small firm sector has become an increasingly important 
part of the UK economy over recent years (see Stanworth & Gray,
1991) it is generally recognized that investors in small enterprises will 
invariably be exposed to a high level of business risk. Indeed, as a
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consequence of the government’s financial deregulation initiatives and 
its promotion of the small firm sector during the boom years of the late 
1980s, the UK economy had by 1990 a greatly increased number of 
young and highly levered firms (see Bank of England, 1991; Keasey & 
Watson, 1992). Failure rates are particularly high for new firms, those 
developing radically new products and/or those producing for new 
markets. Typically, the vulnerability of firms to failure is recognized as 
being greatest in their earlier years; for example, Ganguly (1983), 
based upon official Value Added Tax (VAT) data, found that of those 
firms formed in any year 12 percent will fail in their first year, 26 
percent within two years and 36 percent within three years. Moreover, 
as evidenced fi*om the compulsory liquidation statistics produced in 
Table 1, rates of failure are dramatically increased during economic 
recessions.
However, even for well-established firms, business risk can still be 
expected to be high since it is likely that they will be characterized by 
one or more operational, organizational and/or informational 
deficiencies. Operational factors which are both typical of many small 
firms and which can be expected to increase business risk include a low 
degree of product and/or market diversification, reliance upon relatively 
few customers and/or suppliers and, therefore, limited market power. 
Additional financial contracting difficulties arise due to the owner- 
manager’s dual roles as the sole managerial resource and the main equity 
investor. The lack of a full management team, often also associated with 
the lack of any clear succession once the owner-manager retires, renders 
the future viability of the enterprise wholly contingent upon the 
continued good health, energies, business acumen and financial probity 
of the owner-manager (Keasey & Watson, 1993).
The above characteristics tend to limit the range of possible sources 
of finance and, not surprisingly, a number of government sponsored 
Committees of Inquiry (Bolton, 1971; Macmillan Committee, 1931; 
Wilson, 1979) have concluded that an economically important ‘equity 
finance gap’ exists in respect of unlisted small firms. Consequendy, due 
to the absence of willing outside equity investors, UK small firms are 
almost totally dependent upon short-term bank loans and overdrafts to 
finance their investment and operational requirements once the owners’ 
wealth resources have been fully committed.
The lack of publicly traded equity or debt creates considerable 
uncertainty regarding the value of small firm assets and financial claims. 
Clearly, a major difficulty for outside creditors is that the closely-held, 
owner-managed, firm is almost inevitably going to create severe
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information asymmetries which may be difficult and/or excessively costly 
to overcome. In this context the financial reporting requirements 
applicable to UK small firms compound the problem since they are 
considerably less onerous and less vigorously enforced than is the case 
for widely-held, publicly-listed enterprises (Keasey & Watson, 1988).
The lack of readily available market price and accounting 
information can, therefore, be expected to generate high information 
and exit costs for investors wishing to realize their investment. Such 
information asymmetries are a major source of agency costs since it 
provides opportunities for owner-managers to take actions which may be 
detrimental to the financial claims of other stakeholders. Moreover, as 
subsequent sections will indicate, the incentives for the owner-manager to 
gamble with outside investors’ claims are greatly enhanced when, for 
whatever reason, the firm becomes financially distressed. As both the 
choice of what projects to undertake once the necessary finance has been 
acquired and decisions regarding the level and pattern of owner- 
manager withdrawals of equity (via remuneration and/or dividend 
payments) are under the control of the owner-manger, traditional 
performance measures such as accounting profits, even if available, will 
generally be of limited relevance to an outside investor. An outside 
investor’s security will normally be restricted to the net realizable value of 
the firm’s tangible assets. Only these funds (net of any realization costs) 
will typically be available for distribution to creditors in the event of 
business failure. This implies that, unless alternative control mechanisms 
are available, unsecured outside shareholders, debt suppliers and trade 
creditors will have to incur non-trivial monitoring and information costs.
III. MODELS OF FINANCIAL CONTRACTING 
The Debt Contract
The central feature of a debt contract is that it is meant to be a 
legally enforceable agreement which ensures that the debt supplier 
obtains a prespecified rate of return and schedule of repayments from 
the debtor irrespective of the financial circumstances and returns that 
accrue to the latter. During the life of the contract, the basic problem for 
the creditor is how to ensure that the previously agreed return is 
obtained if the debtors’ financial circumstances deteriorate to the point 
where default becomes a possibility. In this situation, because of the 
(downward) truncated return distribution associated with limited 
liability, owner-managers’ incentives become distorted due to the low
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value of their equity claims. Thus, when firms are financially distressed 
their owner-managers do not bear the full costs of their decisions and 
this provides an incentive to gamble with creditor claims.
As Black and Scholes (1973) have indicated, because of limited 
liability, the payoff function to a risk neutral owner-manager of a levered 
firm is analogous to that of a call option:
M a x [ V t - ( l  + i )Lt . i , 0 ]  (1)
where Vf is the value of the firm at time t, Lf_i is the amount owing to 
outside investors (primarily trade creditors and banks) at i -  1 and i is 
the effective interest rate on the outstanding liabilities for the period t -  
1 to t. This, as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have noted, is a convex function 
which, because of the restricted downside potential, motivates the owner- 
manager to act in a more risk preferring manner. Quite simply, in the 
event of failure (that is when -  (1 + < 0) ^n ‘uncompensated
wealth transfer’ will occur since part of the cost of failure (that is, 
(1 + i)L(_i -  V() will be borne by the creditors. Thus, whenever default 
becomes a possibility (i.e., £{¥() < (1 + i)Lf.i), the owner-manager has an 
incentive to take actions which expose creditors to greater risks and 
which further reduce the value of their financial claims.
To illustrate some of the main ex post difficulties faced by the debt 
supplier, assume for simplicity that no new liabilities or new equity has 
been injected over the period -^1 to t. In this situation, the value of the 
firm at the end of the period, Vf, is simply a function of the value of the 
firm at  ^ -  1 (Vt-i), the profitability of the firm (P^ ) and the owner- 
managers’ drawings {D^ over the period:
Vt = Vt . ^+ Pt - Dt . (2)
However, since + Lf_i, the above can be expressed as:
Vt = Et_i + L f . i + P t - D t .  (3)
Clearly, in order for the firms’ creditors to be fully paid, that is, for it 
to be worthwhile for the owner-manager to exercise his/her call option at 
time t (i.e., to repay the debt), the end of period equity {£() must be 
greater than zero. Thus, the following condition must hold:
(£,.1 + L,.i + P t -  Dt) -  (1 + >  0 (4)
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- D t >  0. (5)
Hence, from the above, it is clear that the probabihty of default can 
be expected to increase as the initial equity position (£/.i) and expected 
profitability (P^ ) fall and when the initial debt level the interest rate 
on the debt (i), and owner-manager drawings (Z)^ ) increase. It is 
important to note, however, that at the time of the decision to lend L at 
< - 1, the outside creditor will only be able to directly observe E .^i and 
i-M- He/she will, at best, only have historic track records and/or forecast 
figures regarding both and Df.
Although information regarding likely profitability in the coming 
period, P^ , may be available at i -  1, the actual value of the firm at time t 
may turn out to be very different from that anticipated. This could occur 
if the owner-manager decided to choose a project with a different risk- 
return profile and/or he/she significantly changed the pattern and level 
of his/her drawings over the period f -  1 to In addition, may be 
significandy adversely effected by exogenous changes in macroeconomic 
conditions. The potential for conflicts of interest to arise is, therefore, 
gready increased during economic downturns and this further increases 
the incentives for ovmer-managers to act in a manner which results (by 
accident or design) in a shift in the distribution of business risk onto the 
creditor.
Given the above, a debt contract will normally contain some provision 
which relieves the original owner of control when he/she no longer bears 
the full costs of his/her decisions, that is, when the firm is perceived to be 
financially distressed. Indeed, from the perspective of the debt supplier, 
the essence of an efficient debt contract is that the allocation of control, 
but not the return, is contingent upon a measure of firm activity. 
Basically, the owner-manager remains in control if the measured activity 
is “good” while the outside investor takes control if it is “bad.” The debt 
contract, by specifying the point at which control of the enterprise 
changes, implicidy determines the point of insolvency. By creating 
through the debt contract an ex ante mechanism of control transfer, the 
contracting parties have effectively made financial distress endogenous— 
financial distress being merely those “bad” states where the contracting 
parties have ex ante agreed to transfer control to the outside investor 
(see Berglofif, 1990 for a review). Of course, in practice, because of the 
closely-held organizational form and other contracting difficulties 
associated with small firms, non-trivial information asymmetries will 
normally exist. In the absence of owner-manager co-operation, an 
outside investor may therefore find it difficult to become sufficiently well-
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informed at an early enough stage to avoid sustaining substantial 
uncompensated losses. Such a view appears to underlie the theoretical 
credit rationing models discussed below.
Credit Rationing Models
In recent years theoretical asymmetric information models have 
increasingly been used to examine financing problems. Most of these 
models have also come to the conclusion that credit rationing of one 
form or another will exist if lenders are unable to overcome such 
information asymmetries (e.g., see De Meza & Webb, 1990). Information 
asymmetries can be of three forms-adverse selection, moral hazard and 
costly state verification. Adverse selection occurs when borrowers differ 
with respect to the probability of repaying their loan and the banks are 
unable to judge the probability of an individual loan being repaid. The 
banks, therefore, have to offer a blanket rate of interest to all loan 
applicants. However, as the rate of interest on loans may affect the 
average quality of loan applicants (e.g., low risk borrowers may exit the 
market if interest rates rise) this asymmetry of information may lead to 
credit rationing as banks attempt to imperfectly classify borrowers into 
different categories and choose not to charge a market clearing loan rate 
which may lead to an overall worsening of the pool of loan applicants.
The problem of moral hazard in relation to the provision of finance 
focuses on the effect that high interest rates may have upon the 
unobservable behavior of the firm and the project undertaken with the 
loan. For example, if lenders attempt to cover potential losses simply by 
charging higher interest rates, this could induce firms to undertake 
riskier projects and, therefore, as in the adverse selection situation, the 
banks may choose to ration funds via methods other than a market 
clearing rate of interest. Thus, the asymmetry of information in either 
the adverse selection or moral hazard case concerns the riskiness of the 
project for which a loan is used rather than the eventual outcome of a 
project.
In contrast to the situations of adverse selection and moral hazard, 
costly state verification occurs where the lenders know as much as the 
borrowers about the riskiness of the projects being fiinded, but only the 
borrower is able to observe his project returns costlessly (see Williamson, 
1986, 1987). In this situation the firm has an incentive to declare a 
return so low as to make it impossible to pay off the debt to the bank, 
even if the return is actually far higher. Banks respond to this incentive 
by committing themselves to incur costly monitoring of the project
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returns of firms that file for bankruptcy^/insolvenq^. As for adverse 
selection and moral hazard, however, the banks have an incentive not to 
charge a market clearing rate of interest. This is because the probability 
of bankruptcy is a positive function of the rate of interest and the banks 
will need to balance the increased monitoring costs with the increased 
monies achieved from higher rates of interest.
All of the above explanations of credit rationing rely upon 
information asymmetries and changes in the rate of interest adversely 
affecting the quality of the loan portfolio or the costs of monitoring. This 
has the consequence that banks have to imperfectly ration loans through 
means other than the rate of interest. AJthough the credit rationing 
literature has added a degree of mathematical rigor to the analysis of 
credit decisions, it is, however, deficient in capturing the nature of the 
relationship between small firms and banks. First, as a general point, the 
results of the theoretical models are not robust to plausible changes in 
important assumptions. For example, the common result of an 
underinvestment equilibrium was overturned by De Meza and Webb
(1987) simply by changing the assumption that all projects have the same 
mean return. Second, the analysis assumes the relationship takes place 
solely via a standard debt contract with a known probability of default. 
Thus, although the banks are able to optimally adjust the interest rate 
they charge on loans, they have no other contract instruments under 
their control. Interestingly, when Bester (1987) included a collateral 
requirement in his model, he was able to derive an equilibrium free of 
the normal credit rationing conclusions. This is because assets used as 
collateral with a net realizable value at least equal to the face value of the 
debt, is analogous to a put option which guarantees that the lender will 
receive the expected payoff irrespective of what happens to the ex post 
profitability of the firm (that is, P<). If the debt is also short-term and/or 
subject to frequent review, then the lender effectively has an “American 
put option” which can be exercised at any time throughout the loan 
period. Moreover, if the assets used as collateral are the borrower’s 
personal (i.e., non-business) assets, then the lender need not be 
concerned with the borrower’s withdrawals of equity (that is, either. 
This solution to the contractual difficulties associated with small firm 
lending, does not require significant expenditures on risk assessment or 
the close monitoring of the borrower’s actions. Also, because the 
collateral requirement safeguards the lender’s investment, it can be 
expected to increase the availability of debt finance and/or lower its costs 
significandy.
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If the ability to provide collateral is, however, a function of wealth 
and borrowers are risk averse, Stiglitz and Weiss (1987) have shown that 
relying exclusively upon a collateral requirement will not be sufficient to 
avoid credit rationing or the issues of adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Where competition between lenders is active, it might be 
expected that firms with insufficient collateral would be willing to bear 
the costs of monitoring and higher interest rates that incorporated the 
correct assessment and pricing of risk. If, however, current lending 
institutions are geared exclusively towards providing loans on a put 
option basis, this change in lending policy would require lending 
institutions to invest heavily in acquiring the specialized knowledge and 
skills necessary to undertake meaningful risk assessment and the 
monitoring of the borrower’s business decisions. The probable high setup 
costs associated with such a change in lending arrangements may prevent 
it from happening, particularly if lenders perceive that they will be 
unlikely to recoup these costs from borrowers without causing adverse 
selection problems which results in significantly increasing the riskiness 
of their loan portfolio.
The above discussion indicates that the theoretical credit rationing 
models are not institutionally rich and are, therefore, limited as an aid to 
understanding the empirical relationships between small firms and 
banks. Not surprisingly, given the mathematical complexities of the 
credit rationing models, there is a relative absence of empirical work 
which can directly test the various implications of different models. One 
notable exception is the work by Berger and Udell (1989). Their results 
reveal substantial rigidities in commercial loan rates and this is consistent 
with the presence of credit rationing. However, they present additional 
evidence which suggests that the quantitative impact of credit rationing is 
likely to be relatively small and furthermore, the rigidities in interest 
rates were found to vary with contract details counter to the conclusions 
of the general credit rationing models. The evidence of Berger and 
Udell suggests, therefore, that other models of the bank financing of 
small firms might be usefully developed and explored. The emphasis of 
recent developments in the theoretical literature has been to alter the 
assumptions made regarding borrower characteristics—the type of 
returns distribution, the risk preferences of the borrowers, etc. To date, 
the (organizational, market or regulatory) characteristics of the lenders 
have played little or no part in these models. In other words, the credit 
rationing models have been largely driven from the demand side with 
the supply side being characterized as a ‘responsive’ perfectly competitive
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situation, a characterisation which does not appear to be empirically well 
founded for the UK.
The UK Secured Bank Overdraft System
The majority of debt finance from the main clearing banks to small 
businesses is advanced using the secured overdraft/short-term loan 
system. As already noted, this solution adopted by the UK banks to the 
contractual problems outiined above is analogous to their purchase of a 
“put option” with an exercise price set equal to the outstanding debt 
+  i)), assumed to be lower than the net realizable value of the 
collaterised assets. With this system, at any time after the loan has been 
provided, the bank has the ability to call-in the loan (an “American” put) 
and be paid in full ahead of all other financial claims. This protects the 
bcmk from down-side business risks, requires litde monitoring or risk 
assessment and allows the banks to charge significantly lower interest rate 
premia (approximately 2 percentage points lower) on secured small 
business lending (see Keasey & Watson, 1995).
The other main characteristic of the overdraft system is its 
“flexibility” which, in normal circumstances, has benefits for both parties. 
Normally, the borrower negotiates an ‘overdraft limit’ with the local 
branch manager. This then allows checks to be drawn at any time on a 
current account in excess of the fiinds available up to this limit. Hence, 
the actual amount borrowed will vary depending upon what checks the 
account holder draws or deposits in this account. As noted earlier, the 
major advantage of the overdraft system for the borrower vis-a-vis a fixed 
term loan is its flexibility. Interest is only charged on the amount by 
which the account is overdrawn and there is no fixed repayment 
schedule. One advantage to the bank is that the interest rates charged on 
outstanding balances can be varied contractually at the bank’s discretion.
Although legally the overdraft facility could be withdrawn at any 
time, the banks normally allow a reasonable period of notice to enable 
the firm to obtain finance elsewhere before requiring either a reduction 
in the overdraft limit or the repayment of the total balance. In ‘normal’ 
circumstances, it is extremely rare for a bank to withdraw an overdraft 
facility, this is after all a fairly profitable line of business for the banks. In 
consequence, the financial planning of many small firms is frequently 
based on the assumption that their overdraft limit represents a 
permanent source of long-term capital. This behavior rarely appears to 
be a cause for concern in periods of economic prosperity, provided that 
the firm stays within its agreed overdraft limit and is able to service the
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interest payments. However, major problems surface when an economic 
downturn occurs and the firm is either unable to stay within its overdraft 
limit or, because of the poorer prospects for the firm, is required by the 
bank to make arrangements to reduce its overdraft by some significant 
amount.
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IV. RELATIONSHIPS AND THE 
STRUCTURE OF UK BANKING 
Small Firm Banking Relationships
The structure of banking within the UK and how this impacts upon 
the small firm/bank relationship is now considered. In examining the 
history and structure of banking within the UK, major differences with 
banking in the US are noted where appropriate. The discussion indicates 
that the market and organizational structures of banking can be expected 
to have an impact on the relationship betwreen the small firm and the 
bank. The work of Petersen and Raj an (1994), who show that the 
closeness of a relationship impacts upon the availability of loans, is 
discussed before going on to consider how the structure of banking 
affects the closeness of small firm/bank relationships in the US and the 
UK.
Petersen and Rajan’s notion of a relationship is that long-term or 
close/intense relationships provide more information to the parties 
about each other. For example, with a long-term ‘relationship’, bank 
lenders will be better able to judge the risk characteristics of a specific 
loan. The ability of a relationship to overcome information asymmetries 
is basically a function of its duration and its scope. Hence the longer a 
relationship has been in existence, the better the lender should be able 
to judge the risk characteristics of a further loan proposal. Equally, where 
a relationship involves a range of products, the lender should have more 
information on which to base his/her loan decisions.
Whether the benefits of such increased information (via an improved 
pool of lending decisions) is passed on to the borrower depends upon 
competition in the market place for capital; which in turn depends on 
the specific forms of the relational information and the market place. If 
the information available from the relationship is purely private and 
cannot be accessed by other external lenders, then it is doubtful whether 
it will necessarily lead to a lower cost of loans—the rents being extracted 
by an essentially monopoly provider. However, the monopoly provider 
may be more willing to provide funds under this increased information
situation. Hence, even if relationships do not lower the costs of funds to 
small firms, they may increase the availability of loans. This latter 
proposition is supported by the empirical evidence reported by Petersen 
and Rajan which indicated that the presence of a long-term relationship 
was associated with an increased availability of finance.
The structure of the lending market may influence the formation of 
particular types of relationship and/or have an effect upon the duration 
and scope of relationships. The one empirical fact to come out of the 
Petersen and Rajan study, and this supports the argument of Mayer
(1988), is that concentration in a local market is beneficial to the 
development of a close relationship which allows the bank to reap the 
benefits of being ‘helpful’ at an early stage of the relationship. 
Furthermore, concentration in a local market is more likely to lead to a 
durable relationship with wider scope because of a lack of viable 
alternatives. However, in a non-competitive situation there are few 
incentives for lenders to incur the costs associated with obtaining a more 
adequate understanding of the risk characteristics of borrowers if default 
costs are solely borne by the latter. Indeed, in this situation, the costs of 
information gathering would be a deadweight cost without any 
corresponding benefit to the lender.
Elliehausen and Wolken’s (1990) research on the use of banking 
services by small and medium sized firms in the US found that small 
enterprises obtained virtually all their financial services from local (within 
a 30 mile radius) financial institutions. Moreover, Elliehausen and 
Wolken suggest that, because the local commercial banks provided 
multiple services, they were the single most important financial 
institution for nearly every small and medium sized business throughout 
the US. The emphasis upon the local bank clearly has an impact on the 
type of relationship that might endure between small firms and banks, 
l i ie  local banker will have a greater personal knowledge of his/her 
customers and their business affairs. On both these grounds, he/she may 
be able to accept classes of business which the large institution, without 
an intimate knowledge of the locality, may see as too risky to take on 
province. In this way, the local bank may be able, at least in part, to 
offset the advantage held by larger institutions in securing a wider spread 
of risks—^both regionally and as between industries; whether the larger 
banks effect this by a means of branch networks or an agency of 
correspondents. Thus the advantage enjoyed by small-scale, local US 
banks is the ability to maintain a relationship through a detailed 
knowledge of specific circumstances and enjoying the flexibility to adjust 
policies accordingly.
The Bank Financing of Small Unlisted Firms in the UK 155
The UK Banking System
The UK banking system is quite different in structure to that of the 
US. The system is based on four major clearing banks (National 
Westminster, Lloyds, Midland and Barclays) who operate nationwide via 
an extensive branch network. Of course, in any one geographic location 
there may be more ‘competition’ between branches of the ‘Big 4’, in 
terms of the range of services provided, than is the case for the local unit 
bank system of the US. However, by any criteria, banking in the UK is 
highly concentrated and this has consequences for small firm/bank 
financial contracts and relationships.
Even so, since 1980 the UK banking sector has faced increased 
domestic and international competition due to several public policy 
initiatives that have significantly altered the economic and regulatory 
environment within which they operate. For example, the abolition of 
exchange controls has opened up the UK domestic market to 
international competition, while financial deregulation legislation has 
allowed other financial institutions (such as building societies) to offer a 
full range of banking facilities including the provision of current 
accounts. As a consequence the UK banks were no longer able to rely 
upon an uncompetitive domestic market to supply them with a cheap 
source of funds from non-interest bearing current accounts. This, along 
with the 1987 Basle Agreement which increased the minimum capital 
adequacy ratios of banks, significantly increased the costs of making 
loans.
As profit margins on lending were squeezed, the banks competed 
more vigorously in terms of the prices of their other services. This led to 
the elimination of implicit cross-subsidisation and to the passing on to 
the customer of the costs of supplying specific services. Hence, while 
those customers with deposits gained from a more competitive rate of 
interest, charges for many other services had to be introduced and/or be 
increased to reflect the marginal cost of supplying these services. This, as 
might be expected, made banks unpopular with customers who 
previously obtained these services free or at a subsidised rate (see 
Chrystal, 1992).
Despite these environmental changes, and in spite of much criticism 
firom small business representatives when the bank uses its put option, 
the secured overdraft still remains the primary form of bank lending to 
small firms in the UK. Although more competition within the UK 
banking sector could haye led to more sophisticated financing this has 
not been the case. Rather increased competition has simply resulted in
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an increased willingness to provide secured overdraft finance (see The 
Bank of England (1991) for empirical evidence). This can be explained 
by at least two factors; an inability and/or unwillingness of small firm 
owner-managers to obtain external equity financing and/or to 
countenance a greater bank involvement with their businesses (see 
Cowling, Samuels, & Sugden, 1991) and the lack of incentives for the 
major UK clearing banks to change their lending policies.
An obvious advantage to the banks of overdraft financing is that it 
limits the judgement required in lending because branch managers only 
have to assess the adequacy of the assets used as security and the ability 
of borrowers to repay in a short time. Relatively unsophisticated lending 
criteria can be used as there is no need to assess the longer term 
profitability of the business. Hence, the expected incremental benefits of 
improved information flows associated with the development of close 
relationships with borrowers are unlikely to be sufficient to give the 
banks a strong incentive to change their lending practices in this 
direction. Moreover, as in most oligopolistic markets, there are big 
disincentives for any one player to step out of line with what other 
players are doing. The concentrated structure of UK banking is at least 
partially responsible for the highly stable (though with occasional bouts 
of “follow-the-leader” behavior) and essentially identical lending 
behavior observed across the main banks.
Another major disincentive to change is that the secured overdraft 
system, because it does not need highly developed lending or risk 
assessment skills, fits in extremely well with the existing appointment and 
career promotion systems of, what are essentially, nationwide, 
hierarchically organised, retail banks. This nationwide retail structure 
requires managers to be sifted for promotion up a long hierarchy. 
Temporarily occupying a number of positions from branch manager and 
below in a number of different geographic areas appears to be an 
essential part of this internal labor market process. The use of overdraft 
finance facilitates this internal labor market process because the bank 
manager only needs to respond to the national headquarters’ edicts 
regarding changes in lending policies. Although the branch manager has 
some discretion in deciding when to call in an overdraft, a dispassionate 
distance in the relationship may be an advantage as personal 
commitment is not allowed to cloud the issue. Thus, the arms length 
nature of overdraft financing facilitates the career processing needs of 
the highly concentrated, hierarchical retail banking sector and this 
concentrated retail-based structure prevents major changes in lending 
behavior.
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As with Other oligopolistic industries, UK banking regularly exhibits 
“follow the leader” behavior in that the ‘Big 4’ closely track each other in 
terms of their market actions. A recent example of this was the increased 
attention by all four banks on small firms in the mid to late 1980s which 
resulted in the ‘Big 4’ clearing banks greatly increasing their total 
funding to a greatly increased UK small firm sector. The banks were able 
to do this because any significant changes in the risks associated with 
competing in this market place would largely be borne by the small firms 
themselves. Thus when the recession came in the early 1990s and the 
assumptions of the boom years of the mid to late 1980s did not 
materialise, the banks simply responded as they had always responded 
and withdrew or reduced their overdraft facilities to firms which 
appeared to be entering financial difficulties. However, not surprisingly, 
this calling in of overdraft finance by the banks in the early 1990s has led 
to conflict and extensive complaints by small business representatives 
who argued that the banks have a responsibility to lend on a sound basis 
and to maintain lending to allow businesses to ride out any temporary 
financial difficulties.
Empirical Evidence
To illustrate how the structure of UK banking and the extensive use 
of secured overdrafts has impacted upon small firm/bank relationships, 
this section briefly reviews the available empirical evidence on the bank 
financing of UK small firms. A study of the bank financing of a sample of 
110 small firms by Keasey and Watson (1992) indicated that bank finance 
and owners’ equity provided almost equal proportions (about 31% each) 
of the overall funding of small firms in 1990. Furthermore, 55 percent of 
the total funding of small firms was short term, with the banks and trade 
creditors each providing roughly a third of this short term finance. Of 
the longer term bank finance, approximately a third was unsecured. The 
majority of both the bank overdrafts and longer term loans were secured 
on either just the directors’ personal assets or a combination of business 
and personal assets. The average security ratio of assets to loans was 
slightly under three, which is remarkably similar to the figures reported 
by both Cowling et al (1991) and Binks, Ennew, and Yead (1992). The 
study also indicated an increased reliance upon short-term debt relative 
to equity over the expansionary period to 1990 and this certainly 
increased the vulnerability of firms to the subsequent economic 
downturn. This increased reliance upon short term debt is also reported 
by the Bank of England (1991). Basically, there is ovenvhelming evidence
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Table 1







UK FT All- 
Share Index
Rate of UK 
Wholly 
Unemployed UK* GDP




1985 14.898 682.9 11.0 86.1 5.2
1986 14,405 835.5 11.1 90.4 7.2
1987 11,439 870.2 9.3 94.5 9.4
1988 9,427 926.6 7.4 98.6 40.4
1989 10,456 1,204.7 5.8 99.8 24.2
1990 15,051 1,032.3 6.3 99.1 1.3
1991 21,827 1,187.7 8.9 97.5 -0.1
1992 24,425 1,363.8 10.4 97.7 -4.1
Notes: *June 1990 = 100.0
House Price series provided by the Halifax Building Society. 
The rest of the series are taken from Datastream.
that the major clearing banks in the UK played a major part in fuelling, 
on the back of overdraft financing, the growth of the small firm sector 
and general boom conditions in the UK economy during the late 1980s 
(see Table 1).
The study by Keasey and Watson (1992) also indicated that the 
clearing banks, in their haste to chase available business during the mid 
to late 1980s, had left themselves increasingly exposed to an economic 
downturn. Thus although the average profitability of the sample was 
consistently high over the six year period up to 1991 (for instance, in 
1990 the average profits before interest payments and directors fees as a 
percentage of turnover was approximately 16%), in each year directors’ 
fees were approximately some 70 percent of total operating profits. Since 
this represents funds withdrawn from the business, it is clear that 
typically only a small proportion of the firms’ earnings will be directly 
available for satisfying claims of creditors. Nevertheless, the banks can be 
expected to be most concerned with the security  ^ of the lending rather 
than with the firm’s profitability. This is supported by the empirical 
findings of Keasey and Watson (1995) who found that the risk premia 
charged by banks on small firm overdrafts/loans were positively related to 
firm specific risk factors such as leverage and a lack of asset backed 
security.
With the onset of the recession in the early 1990s, the earlier dash by 
the major banks for small firm lending was replaced by a concern over 
the poor quality of the past lending to small firms. As can be seen fi"om 
Table 1, during 1990 property prices and GDP fell and dramatic 
increases in the number of company liquidations occurred. Since 
property was the basis of the banks’ put option, overdrafts were called in 
or limits tightened, which further increased the number of small business 
failures. Keasey and Watson (1995) also found that small firm interest 
rate premia increased by approximately three percent as the UK 
economy turned towards recession after 1990.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has considered the nature of small firm/bank relationships in 
the UK. It has been argued that the relationship can only be understood 
if three factors are borne in mind-the special nature of small firms and 
their operating environment, the structure of banking in the UK and its 
use of overdraft financing, and the impact the general macro-economy 
has on the relationship. During 1991, the main UK clearing banks were 
on the receiving end of a lot of criticism fi’om small businesses, 
particularly those experiencing financial difficulties. The criticisms were 
wide ranging and included claims of insensitivity over the handling of 
small firm accounts, over-charging in terms of interest payments, of 
applying bank charges without informing the customer, being overly 
eager in calling in their loans and demanding too high a level of security. 
The media and small business pressure groups were not slow to take up 
these issues and even the ‘quality’ newspapers devoted several pages to 
the ‘horror stories’ recounted by small business owners. Now that the 
media interest in the issue has diminished, it has become obvious that 
the main cause of the large increases in small business failures was the 
recessionary impact of the government’s high interest rate monetary 
policy. Although the Cowling et al (1991) and Binks et al (1992) studies 
were critical of the banks on some counts, both reached similar 
conclusions.
In reply to the accusation of abusing their monopoly power by 
increasing their margins on small firm lending precisely when firms were 
most financially vulnerable, the banks have argued that this simply 
reflects their increased monitoring costs and greater exposure to business 
risk in economic downturns. The recently published evidence from 
surveys of small business owners (Cowling et al, 1991 and Binks et al,
1992), however, indicate that most small firms pay interest rates only
160 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE 4(2/3) 1995
some 2-4 percent above base rates and that bank margins on small firm 
lending have increased only marginally as the recession deepened. 
Perhaps the major source of recent concern has been the perception that 
a significant number of small firms have failed because the banks were 
too ready to call in the receivers whenever any hint of financial problems 
came to light. These concerns were inevitably fuelled during 1991 and 
1992 by the downturn in macroeconomic activity because, as Chrystal 
(1992) has noted:
“Money lenders have had a bad press in recessions ever since Biblical 
times. In this regard, banks do not cause the problem—rather it is the 
inevitable outcome of a business downturn. The bank simply conveys the 
news that negative cash flow cannot go on for ever.”
It could be argued that the banks’ concern with protecting the 
security of their investments merely reflects the nature of the debt 
contract—blenders do not share in upside potential and, therefore, do not 
expect to becir any uncompensated downside risks. However, it needs to 
be emphasized that it is the concentrated structure of banking within the 
UK that has allowed the banks to compete via an increased provision of 
relatively safe overdraft finance rather than longer terms loans or hybrid 
sources of finance. In other words, some of the responsibility for the 
recent financial problems facing the small firm sector must lay with the 
relatively indiscriminate expansion of small firm funding via overdraft 
financing. The costs incurred by the banks themselves over the recent 
recession from small firm failures has led to pronouncements that future 
fimding will be more cognizant of the specific characteristics of 
individual loans.
None the less, it would be unfair to see the relationships between 
small firms and banks being driven purely from side of the banks. 
Perhaps the only method by which conflicts between small firms and 
banks could be reduced would be if small firms secured more external 
equity finance. There is, of course, no guarantee that if equity risk capital 
were made available via the market that the contractual arrangements 
with small businesses would be any more agreeable to them. Indeed, part 
of the apparent conflict between small firms and banks in the UK exists 
precisely because small firm owners are unwilling to bind themselves to 
agreements that require them to share control and upside gains with 
external equity suppliers. This certainly appears to be the case judging 
by the highly negative attitudes expressed by small business owner- 
managers towards the possibility of equity holdings by banks (see 
Cowling et al., 1991).
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